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Dollars and Sense: Does Economic Self-Interest or Emotional Attachment Better
Explain Vote Choice?
Abstract
This paper seeks to understand voter choice using a dichotomous model differentiating between
economic self-interest and emotional attachment. Using survey data from the American National Election
Studies (ANES) database, this paper first utilizes a unique scaling technique and then a pseudo R-Square
method to determine which independent variable, economic self-interest or emotional attachment
(affect), contains more explanatory power in predicting voter choice. The findings support the hypothesis
that economic self-interest contains the most explanatory power in predicting voter choice, though the
degree of difference varies across elections.
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DOLLARS AND SENSE: DOES ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST OR
EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT BETTER EXPLAIN VOTER CHOICE?
Daniel Truesdale
Abstract: This paper seeks to understand voter choice using a dichotomous model
differentiating between economic self-interest and emotional attachment. Using survey
data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) database, this paper first
utilizes a unique scaling technique and then a pseudo R-Square method to determine
which independent variable, economic self-interest or emotional attachment (affect),
contains more explanatory power in predicting voter choice. The findings support the
hypothesis that economic self-interest contains the most explanatory power in predicting
voter choice, though the degree of difference varies across elections.
INTRODUCTION
“It’s the economy, stupid!” These words uttered by James Carville were meant to
serve as a reminder to Bill Clinton’s presidential team in 1992 to focus the campaign
message on the economy and its wretched performance under President George H.W.
Bush. Although elementary, the saying depicts citizens as myopic voters concerned
solely with monetary well-being. Of course, no campaign would forgo other interests,
such as social issues, emotion, and loyalty solely for economics. The slogan was meant to
pinpoint the significance of the economy as one of the most, if not the most, important
matter facing voters.
Interestingly enough, according to the Huffington Post,89 President Obama
became the first president since Ronald Reagan to win re-election with an unemployment
rate above 6 percent, and became the only President since Franklin D. Roosevelt to win
re-election with an unemployment rate above 7 percent. This phenomenon serves as a
gateway to revisit the “known” assumptions of voter choice. Perhaps it is not “stupid” to
believe other factors take precedence over economics in understanding voter choice. This
research intends to investigate voter choice and better understand the conceptual
framework of the individual voter.
The paper is divided into the following format; a literature review of voter choice
is presented, which assists in developing the hypothesis and theory that individuals are
89
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more likely to vote for the candidate within their economic self-interest utilized in the
paper. I then provide an overview of the data and methods, and discuss the results of the
paper with avenues for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
It is imperative to understand the conceptual difference between voter turnout and
voter choice. Berry and Gersen90 concluded different timing regimes produce different
turnout rates across local governments, thereby impacting policy outcomes. Another
study by Childers and Binder91 from the University of Utah sought to examine the impact
of direct democracy on voter participation. The authors concluded direct democracy does
not inherently increase voter turnout, but it is instead competitive ballot races that
mobilize voters.
Though exploring avenues to increase voter turnout is important to the discipline,
this study analyzes an individual voter’s choice. The question poses unique challenges,
specifically due to the normative tilt of the research. However, this paper designs a
dichotomous model for voter choice between economic self-interest and emotional
attachment in an attempt to understand voter choice.
Economic Self-Interest
Anthony Downs was the first prominent scholar to define what constitutes a
rational vote. In his work, An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs develops the
concept of a rational voter based primarily on the self-interest axiom which asserts a voter
is beholden to selfish ends. “Thus, whenever we speak of rational behavior, we always
mean rational behavior directed towards selfish ends.”92 The “ends” the individual seeks
are benefits, which can be described as streams of utility received from the government.
Downs lists several examples of utility including; policing of streets, purified water,
defended shores, etc. Even though Downs acknowledges rational individuals can receive
utility from “events that are only remotely connected to their own material income,”93
there is an emphasis in his writing to assimilate utility with economic gain.
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Downs transitions from the rational individual to the rational voter stating, “As
we have shown, every voter makes his voting decisions by comparing various real and
hypothetical streams of utility.”94 In essence, An Economic Theory of Democracy
conditions economic self-interest as a provision of voter choice.
Bryan Caplan’s work, The Myth of the Rational Voter takes a pessimistic view of
rationality among American voters. It is Caplan’s persistence to integrate the notion of
rationality with economic self-interest that assists in priming the concept as a condition of
voter choice. “The reason why I emphasize economics is that it is at the heart of most
modern policy disputes. Regulation, taxes, subsidies-they all hinge on beliefs about how
policy affects economic outcomes.”95 Caplan believes American’s ignorance of
economics allows them to be swayed by irrational beliefs.
The central idea is that voters are worse than ignorant, they are, in a
word, irrational and vote accordingly...Yet common sense tells us
that emotion and ideology-not just the facts or their processingpowerfully sway human judgment96
In many ways, Caplan is in conversation with Downs regarding the importance of
economic self-interest and its foundation for voter choice.
Bartels scorns the irrationality of voters for supporting the Bush tax-cuts. Noting
most Americans express strong egalitarian values, American support for the tax-cuts was
irrational. “I have argued that public support for the Bush-tax cuts derived in considerable
part from unenlightened considerations of self-interest among people who did not
recognize the implications of President Bush’s policies for their own economic wellbeing or their broader political values.”97 Echoing Downs in defining rational behavior in
the context of economic self-interest, Bartels also voices Caplan’s concern in regard to
the unenlightened American.
Additional works have discussed the role of economic self-interest and its
prevalence in voter choice. An article by Conover and Feldman recognizes the dichotomy
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of voter choice and conditions economic self-interest as a staple. Conover and Feldman
identify economic reason as a condition of voter choice explaining,
In keeping with Downs’ classic analysis in An Economic Theory of
Democracy, current researchers depict the individual as a “rational”
information processor who carefully reviews the available
information about the economy, and then uses it in the most logical
and efficient way possible to make political evaluations and
decisions.98
Emotional Attachment
The second pillar of voter choice is emotional attachment. The presence of
emotion in voter choice can best be summarized by Conover and Feldman who discuss
the presence of emotional responses to the state of the economy.
Political scientists picture the American public as one populated by
individuals who deal with economic information in a sterile manner
devoid of feelings. Yet, the accuracy of this description is belied
daily by those people we encounter both in our own personal lives
and through the media; people who are depressed over
unemployment, worried about being laid off, angry over inflation.99
As Brader acknowledges, “Politicians routinely appeal to the emotions of voters.”100 It is
therefore reasonable to assume voters are not isolated “statisticians” as suggested by
Popkin, but are living beings, conflicted with emotion. Scholars such as Sears, Mutz,
Conover, Feldman, Huddy, Gunnthorsdottir, and Marcus have also deliberated the
important role emotion plays in voter choice.
As previously discussed by Downs, reason is a result of gathering information and
constructing a “rational vote” based on economic self-interest. This implies the voter
utilizes thought (cognition) invoking reason. Since Down’s theory already assumes
individuals are rational voters this inherently implies cognitive voters. Thus, whenever
cognition is discussed, assume cognition in Downs’s sense, which implies use of reason,
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thereby assimilating reason with economic self-interest. In an attempt to distinguish
emotion from reason (cognition) Conover and Feldman provide further clarification.
In the most general sense, affect refers to a subjective state which
involves arousal of the autonomic nervous system of the interruption
of attention. In comparison, cognition is “knowing”; it involves the
representation of knowledge and the processes involved in acquiring
such information.101
Thus, emotion is experienced prior to cognition. Another way to relate the two
concepts is to consider emotion as a state without cognition. This fact inherently creates a
methodological problem. As noted by Mutz, “Unfortunately, the traditional survey
method has made it difficult to disentangle the experience of emotional arousal from the
cognitive assessment of the object and the labeling of the specific emotion.”102 In other
words, critics argue respondents verbalizing emotion have allowed cognition to adulterate
pure emotion. Many in the discipline debate the nuance between emotion and like
concepts. For instance, Mutz discusses the difference between political attitudes and
political emotion. Conover and Feldman identify the confusion within the discipline in
distinguishing between emotion and terms such as mood, attitude, and feeling. Although
the concepts are in many ways similar, their discrete differences cause pitfalls during
operationalization.
Conflict Between Emotion and Reason
For this research, clarification is offered between emotion and attitude. Emotion,
as described by Marcus, is enticed by a specific stimulus. “There is some consensus that,
for example, moods can be differentiated from emotions because emotions have an
explicit source.”103 As a result, emotion is tied to political symbols. “Political symbols
often evoke and mobilize human emotions.”104 On the contrary, attitudes are an
accumulation of emotion, unlinked to a specific stimulus. Sears elaborates,
Any given attitude object is composed of one or more symbolic
elements, and each element conveys some meaning to the
101
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individual. Attitudes toward the object as a whole reflect some
combination of the affects previously conditioned to the specific
symbols included in it.” 105
Another way to compare the two concepts is to consider attitudes as an accumulation of
emotion. A voter’s attitude towards a political candidate is a consequence of emotional
responses towards symbols, which aggregate into attitude.
In the context of this research, emotion is tied to political symbols, and attitudes
are predispositions towards individual candidates. Popkin describes the important role
symbols play in campaigns. As he states, “To communicate their opinions rapidly,
candidates and their strategies search for concrete symbols that serve as information
shortcuts, as cognitive placeholders and focal points, to their position on larger abstract
problems.”106 Examples of symbols tied to the candidate include gender, religion,
ethnicity, race, height, weight, personal wealth, and other demographic traits. Overall, the
accumulation of symbols corresponds into attitudinal positions towards candidates. “The
prototypical example of a politician's excessive emotional display is contained in the
image of Democratic presidential primary frontrunner Edmund Muskie weeping in
response to slurs about his wife by a conservative newspaper publisher.”107
The relationship between cognition and affect has been noted in many
studies across the discipline. Sears and Citrin see the passage of Proposition 13
as a display of voters exercising reason in the context of economic self-interest,
while Rabuska and Ryan see the event in a symbolic context. Historically,
reason (cognition) and affect (emotion) have often been seen as counterparts in
the context of voter choice. As Sears notes in his research, “Which of them
plays the more important role in mass politics is an old debate, originally
framed by James Madison in the Federalist Papers as pitting passion against
reason.”108
Not all scholars have worked to pin reason against emotion. The best example is
the development of affective intelligence. The theory developed by Marcus, Neuman, and
105
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MacKuen argues that affect causes voters to become sophisticated about politics. “When
anxious about how things are going in the political world, this generalized anxiety drives
a search for more information, and for better use of existing information resources. Thus
greater political intelligence is induced by emotion.”109 In this model, emotion precedes
cognition. As Ladd and Lenz note, those expressing anxiety may already be more
engaged in an election or may hold intense preference that thereby produced anxiety.
Thus, affective intelligence assumes emotion precedes cognition, but no validation has
been offered.
Across the discipline there is a growing trend suggesting affect has a stronger
impact on voter choice, relative to economic reason. The American Voter Revisited
recognizes the division between the two, economic self-interest and emotional
attachment, and gives more weight towards the latter. Sears explicitly states affect has
greater impact in understanding voter choice over cognition. “Fourth, affect often
dominates cognition.”110 Most notably, Popkin argues voters have no choice but to rely
on emotion and political symbols to exercise a vote. Additionally, Kuklinski concludes
voters have low personal costs in the context of economic self-interest when it comes to
elections and therefore rely on symbols to assist their decision making process.
THEORY, QUESTION, AND HYPOTHESIS
The model used in this paper encompasses economic self-interest and emotional
attachment, analyzing their impact on voter choice. Theorizing voter choice can be
understood within an economic and emotional context in which voters display only two
voids, economic self-interest and emotional attachment with candidates filling any
combination of voids.
An interesting phenomenon occurs when a candidate fills one void, while leaving
the other vacant. For instance, Candidate X fills Voter Y’s economic self-interest void,
but neglects his emotional, symbolic needs. Likewise, Candidate A fills Voter B’s
emotional, symbolic needs, but neglects her economic self-interest. The previously
mentioned scenarios create a dilemma in predicting voter choice. Which void, economicself-interest or emotional attachment, takes precedence in comprehending voter’s choice?
109
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Put differently, which independent measure is superior in explaining voter choice? This
original question is the primary focus of this paper and expands on previous research that
has displayed economic self-interest and emotional attachment as prominent features of
voter choice. The research presented in this paper is unique in attempting to discover
which of these variables holds the greatest explanatory power for the dependent variable.
Answering this inquiry will undoubtedly lead to an enriched understanding of voter
choice.
This paper’s hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, a variable that measures economic
self-interest, will offer a better prediction of voter choice compared to a variable that
measures emotional attachment.
As discussed in The Voter Decides, it is often difficult to separate personal
attributes (symbols) from intervening cognition. For instance, an individual expressing a
statement such as, “I like Dwight Eisenhower” would be displaying an attitude towards
the candidate that is the accumulation of symbols. However, if a different individual
states, “I like Dwight Eisenhower, I approve of his decision regarding Korea,” the
measurement entertains a paradox. In this specific case, it is difficult to separate personal
attributes from policy positions. For the second individual, it is unclear if the attitude
towards Eisenhower is a result of emotionally charged symbols or a reflection of his
policies. That is, does the individual like Dwight Eisenhower or does he approve of the
war in Korea? This specific nuance has the potential to create methodological fallacies.
METHOD AND RESULTS
Survey data was gathered from the American National Election Studies (ANES)
database, specifically for the 1992, 1996, 2004, and 2012 presidential elections. For each
respective year, questions regarding a respondent's age and gender were extracted from
the data set, along with party identification. Variables that emphasized emotional
attachment and economic self-interest were also removed from the data set. Emotional
attachment was operationalized from a series of questions asking a respondent if they had
ever felt angry, proud, hopeful, or afraid in regards to a presidential candidate.111
Economic self-interest was operationalized from questions specific to each election year.
111
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In 1992, respondents were asked which candidate would do a better job handling the
economy. In 1996 and 2004, the respondents were asked if they approve of the
President’s handling of the economy. In 2012, the survey asked if the respondent believed
the economy would get better, stay about the same, or get worse if either of the two
candidates were elected to office. Tables in the Appendix have been dedicated to
illustrating the slight differences between the questions for each election year and for
each candidate.
Scaling Method
A scaling system was created for the 1992 and 2012 elections. Recall the
theoretical construct for this paper attempts to condition voter choice as a conflict
between economic self-interest and emotional attachment. In order to gain a deeper
understanding of voter choice, the two variables can be analyzed in alternate
compositions.
As previously mentioned, interesting cases arise when candidates fill one distinct
void of a voter while leaving the other vacant. For instance, Candidate X fills Voter Y’s
economic self-interest void but is unable to fill the void of emotional attachment.
Likewise, Candidate A fills Voter B’s emotional needs but neglects her economic selfinterest. Which void, economic self-interest or emotional attachment, takes precedence in
comprehending voter’s choice? Producing a scaling system attempts to answer this
inquiry. Table 1 provides the rules for the scaling system for the 1992 election.
Table 1: Scaling System Procedures for the 1992 Election.
Numerical
Definition
Score
1

Respondent indicated a sentiment of “anger” & “afraid” towards the candidate
and did not indicate the candidate would be better at handling the economy

2

Respondent indicated sentiment of “anger” & “afraid” towards the candidate
but did indicate the candidate would be better at handling the economy

3

Respondent indicated sentiment of “hopeful” & “proud” but did not indicate
the candidate would be better at handling the economy

4

Respondent indicated strong sentiment of “hopeful” & “proud” and did
indicate the candidate would be better at handling the economy
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Table 2 provides the findings from the scaling system for both the 1992 and 2012
election. In order to understand the table, a few clarifications are made. First, the scaling
system collected data for all respondents and sorted the individuals respectively into each
category. The data was then filtered for voter support, meaning only voters indicating
support for Bush or Clinton remained in the sample and were categorized respectfully. In
an attempt to distinguish which category contained the most explanatory power in
predicting voter choice, a measurement entitled “Prediction Accuracy” was computed.
Simple arithmetic is utilized to construct this measurement, illustrated in Equation 1.
Utilizing this statistic allows comparison of the four, distinct categories across different
candidates and elections. Whichever category contains the highest score of “Prediction
Accuracy” implies it is a better predictor of voter choice.
Table 2: Scaling System Results for the 1992 and 2012 Elections.
Percent Votes
Category

Bush 1992

Clinton 1992

Obama 2012

Romney 2012

1

1%

2%

.16%

.16%

2

23%

35%

0%

0%

3

25%

47%

71%

78%

4

80%

84%

85%

84%

Equation 1:
Prediction Accuracy = (Intended Support ÷ Total Number of Respondents) ∗ 100
As expected, in 1992 both candidates received the greatest support from Category
4 and the least from Category 1. It appears Category 3 contains a higher predictive value
relative to Category 2, implying affect variables are a better predictor of voter choice,
compared to the economic variable. Thus concluding emotional attachment is a greater
predictor of voter choice compared to economic self-interest. However, there are
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shortcomings in utilizing this method. Only a trivial number of respondents scored into
Category 2, even before the data was filtered for candidate support. The low number of
individuals occupying Category 2 is concerning, possibly implying methodological
shortcomings. For this reason, the procedure was re-administered for the 2012 election.
To check for robustness, the same procedure was utilized to scale the 2012
election. There are minute differences in the affect variables and economic variables. The
Appendix offers clarification of the differences.
Both candidates received the greatest amount of support from Category 4, which
is expected. The interesting phenomenon is Category 2. When observing all voters, the
number of voters between Category 2 and 3 were nearly identical for Romney. However,
Romney received 0% of voter support from Category 2 and 78% from Category 3.
Obama displayed a miniscule number of respondents in Category 2 even before the data
were filtered for support. Overall, it appears positive; affect variables contain more
explanatory power in predicting voter choice relative to economic self-interest. The
surprising finding is the low percentage of voter support from Category 2 for both
candidates. When only examining the 1992 election, it appears Category 2 entailed some
explanatory power for voter choice, but was statistically 0% in the 2012 election.
The findings from the scaling technique are surprising and concerning. The 0% of
“Prediction Accuracy” from Category 2 in 2012 implies methodological shortcomings.
Therefore, the paper turns to an alternate method in addressing the research question and
hypothesis.
Pseudo R-Square Method
For each election, the affect variables were added together and then averaged to
calculate a new variable entitled “Average Affect Index”. This new measurement was
instituted in a binary logistic regression, along with an economic self-interest variable and
other control variables. Four tables illustrating the calculation of the “Average Affect
Index” can be located in the Appendix. For the sake of this paper, note the “Average
Affect Index” is on a different scale for each election. The higher a respondent scores, the
warmer they feel towards the candidate. The lowest score a respondent could receive was
“0” representing extreme dislike for the candidate. A voter’s average feeling towards the
candidate could fall anywhere between the lowest and highest score. The affect scale runs
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from 0 to 1 for the 1992 election, 0-3 for the 1996 elections, and 0-4 for the 2012
elections.
A Pseudo R-Square technique was utilized to determine which independent
variable, economic self-interest or emotional attachment, is a better predictor for voter
choice. First, an initial regression estimating voter support for a particular candidate is
presented, with all variables significant at the .01 level. From this regression, the initial
Pseudo R-Square was calculated. Then, from the initial regression, the economic selfinterest variable was extracted and the Pseudo R- Square was recalculated. The restricted
R-Square value was then subtracted from the initial value. The previous step was
repeated for the affect variable. Whichever difference is greater indicates the associated
independent variable that contains the most explanatory power in predicting voter choice.
Results
Note each independent variable in the binary logistic regression is significant at
the .01 level for all the regressions studied in this paper. Tables in the Appendix are
provided illustrating the significance along with a definition for the independent
variables. In addition, select tables in the Appendix illustrate calculations.
Table 3: Reduction in Cox and Snell R Square.
Regression

Bush
1992

Clinton
1992

Clinton
1996

Bush
2004

Obama
2012

Romney
2012

Economic variable
omitted

.092

.084

.088

.112

.167

.14

Affect variable
omitted

.047

.061

.009

.027

.018

.035

Both the Cox & Snell and the Nagelkerke R Square test indicate the most
explanatory power was lost when the economic variable was removed from the
regression. For instance in the 1992 election (Bush), the Cox & Snell reports 0.092 of
explanatory power for the regression was lost when the economic variable was removed.
Likewise, 0.047 of explanatory power was lost when the average affect variable was
removed. This implies the economic variable contains more explanatory power, relative
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to the affect variable. Thus, the first regression studied supports the original hypothesis;
economic self-interest is a better predictor of voter choice, relative to emotional
attachment.
The results from the Clinton regressions also support the original hypothesis. The
most amount of explanatory power was lost when the economic variable was removed
from the regression, relative to the affect variable. Therefore, the 1992 election overall
supports the hypothesis. The same analysis is presented for the 1996, 2004, and 2012
election. Recall, the 1996 and 2004 elections could only examine the incumbent
president.
The 1996 data supports the hypothesis; economic self-interest contains more
explanatory power for voter choice over emotional attachment. As is evident from Table
3 most of the explanatory power was lost when the economic variable was removed from
the regression. Relative to the 1992 election, the economic variable in 1996 appeared
even more significant. For example, the Cox and Snell reports that 0.088 of explanatory
power was lost when the economic variable was removed, but only 0.009 of explanatory
power was lost when the average affect variable was omitted from the regression.
Therefore, the data from the 1996 election also supports the original hypothesis.
The 2004 results are consistent with the 1992 and 1996 election cycles. When the
economic variable is removed from the binary logistic regression, the Pseudo R-Square
loses the most amount of explanatory power, relative to when the affect variable is
removed. The final results presented in this paper are for the 2012 election cycle.
Identical to the 1992 cycle, both candidates (the incumbent and the challenger) are
observed.
The results from the 2012 election solidify the findings of this paper. Both
President Obama and Governor Romney experienced the highest loss in explanatory
power when the economic variable was removed from the regression, relative to
emotional attachment.
In each election year and for each candidate there was a greater reduction in
explanatory power in voter support when the economic self-interest variable was removed
from the regression, relative to the emotional attachment variable. What gives even more
strength to the findings is that the survey question used to operationalize economic self-
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interest was unique for each election, suggesting the results are not due to specific survey
phrasing.
Table 4: Difference in Reduction Between Pseudo R-Square (Reduction When Economic
Variable Was Omitted – Reduction when Affect Variable was Omitted)
Year

Difference Between the Reductions
(Cox and Snell)

1992 (H.W. Bush)

.045

1992 (Clinton)

.023

1996 (Clinton)

.079

2004 (Bush)

.085

2012 (Romney)

.105

2012 (Obama)

.149

Each election experienced different reductions in Pseudo R-Square when omitting
the variables. For instance, the economic variable and the average affect variable were
closest in explaining the binary logistic regression for the 1992 elections. In 1992 for
Clinton, the difference between the reduction in Pseudo R-Square between these two
variables was a miniscule 0.023. In this regard the variables were essentially equal in
explaining voter choice. However, the 2012 Obama regressions illustrated the greatest
difference in explanatory power between the economic and affect variable with a
difference of 0.149. As is presented in Table 4, the differences became more significant in
the later elections, specifically in 2012. This may be a result of the economic question
becoming more detailed, allowing respondents to further embrace which candidate is in
their economic self-interest, giving support to the hypothesis that economic self-interest
is truly a stronger predictor of voter choice.
CONCLUSION
This research is limited in some regards. First, the paper only investigated voter
choice for presidential elections. It may be that voters exhibit different preferences for
local elections as well as for congressional elections. In addition, the research was limited
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to the timeline of the past two decades. In earlier decades voters may have decided
differently; individuals more concerned with issue, personality, and affect variables. This
paper recognizes a potential pitfall with the operationalization of the economic selfinterest and emotional attachment variables, name, the failure of survey data to delve
deeper into the reasoning of voter choice. In addition, this paper recognizes the difficulty
in parsing affect (emotion) from economic reason. Although the variables used in this
research were tested for multicollinearity, the two concepts have yet to be effectively
disentangled, which may impact the results. Future research might wish to explore if the
economic self-interest remains the prominent independent variable relative to emotional
attachment for different elections. It may be local elections are more subject to affect,
relative to federal elections. Future endeavors should also investigate alternate techniques
in capturing affect from a voter. This paper began discussing the methodological fallacies
in using survey data to collect affect, so improving the tools of research will certainly
advance analysis and interpretation.
This paper began with a simple inquiry. Which can better explain voter choice:
emotional attachment or economic self-interest? After utilizing many different
techniques, it’s clear that economic self-interest best explains voter choice, relative to
emotional attachment. It appears James Carville was right after all, “It’s the economy
stupid!”
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